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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Modem environmental law enforcement relies on cooperative efforts of
states and federal agencies. This approach is referred to as a cooperative feder-
alism process. Under this process, the federal government sets national statuto-
ry or regulatory environmental standards but allows states the flexibility to
determine how to meet those standards. Under most environmental regulations,
the federal government delegates enforcement authority to the states, yet
stands ready to step in if a state either fails to devise a method to meet the
standards, takes inadequate action, or simply fails to take required enforcement
actions against violators. The cooperative federalism approach raises the ques-
tion of whether the federal government can seek enforcement of the national
standards after a state initiates enforcement action. Thus far, courts have not
held the doctrine of claim preclusion to defeat the federal government's in-
dependent jurisdiction following state enforcement actions.'
The federal government's paternalistic role serves as an enforcement
safety net to the state's primary responsibility for environmental compliance.2
The popular support for this federal safety net, however, has diminished in
recent years. The emergence and popularity of the phrase "unfunded federal
mandates," as a substitute term for "cooperative federalism," provides evi-
dence of this decline. This Survey discusses two Tenth Circuit decisions from
the survey year that involve conflicts resulting from the dual federal/state
approach to environmental law.3
In Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc.,4 the Tenth Circuit limited New
Mexico's authority to invoke federal jurisdiction to seek penalties under the
Clean Air Act. This Survey analyzes the Tenth Circuit's approach, which
recognizes the supervisory and enforcement role that court's traditionally at-
tribute to the federal agencies. The Survey also discusses dicta from the opin-
ion that reflects the Tenth Circuit's willingness to depart from the traditional
1. See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1549-51 (W.D. Mo. 1990)
(holding that the Clean Air Act provides for independent federal enforcement, even if state con-
cludes manufacturer is in compliance); United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 418-20 (D.
Md. 1985) (refusing to dismiss or stay a federal enforcement action because of administrative
consent order entered into after federal notice of violation issued). But cf Alabama ex rel.
Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that a state
cannot enforce state regulations without also enforcing federal regulations).
2. Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
3. The survey year covers decisions issued by the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1993
and December 31, 1994. In the preceding year, the Tenth Circuit considered the federal/state inter-
action in United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 922
(1994); see also Shane J. Harvey, Environmental Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 961, 978
(1994) (discussing the Tenth Circuit's recognition of state authority to regulate federal facilities).
4. 32 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994).
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claim preclusion doctrine.
In Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners,5 the court
considered the issue of whether the federal Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act ("RCRA") preempted state and local hazardous waste regulations.6
After identifying the consistent guidance the Tenth Circuit provided for the
lower court to follow on remand, the Survey discusses the distinction between
the application of the preemption test in the Eighth Circuit and various state
Supreme Courts,7 and the factual application proposed by the Tenth Circuit in
Blue Circle Cement.8
I. STATES' AUTHORITY TO INVOKE FEDERAL JURISDICTION AFTER
PREVAILING IN STATE ACTION: ESPINOSA V. ROSWELL TOWER, INC. 9
A. Background
Whether referred to as cooperative federalism or unfunded federal man-
dates, the dual federal/state process constitutes a common thread in the en-
forcement of most modem environmental laws."° Under the Clean Air Act
("CAA")," for example, the federal Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") identifies criteria pollutants 2 and sets air quality standards 3 for
such pollutants to provide, with an adequate margin of safety, for human
health. 4 The standards established for the criteria pollutants constitute the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). The states have the
responsibility of meeting these standards. The Act requires each state to sub-
mit a State Implementation Plan ("SIP") demonstrating its proposed method(s)
of meeting the NAAQS.5 If the EPA determines that the SIP is sufficient to
meet the CAA standards, it must approve the SIP. 6 If, on the other hand, the
EPA determines that a SIP proposed by a state is insufficient to meet the
Clean Air Act standards, the EPA has the authority to implement a Federal
Implementation Plan ("FIP") in lieu of a SIP. 7
Both state and federal agencies can enforce a SIP. Section 7411(c) of the
CAA authorizes state enforcement of a SIP 8 and § 7413(a) and (b) authorize
5. 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1504.
7. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
8. See Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508-09.
9. 32 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994).
10. Another commonly employed method is to attach conformity conditions on the receipt of
federal funds. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423-24 (1992).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. Criteria pollutants refer to the substances for which EPA has established National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). Criteria pollutants include carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur
dioxide (SO 2), ozone (03), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), lead (Pb), and particulates. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1-
.12 (1994).
13. Standards are established based on a per unit volume basis. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (Supp. V 1993).
18. Section 7411 (c) states:
(c) State implementation and enforcement of standards of performance
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federal enforcement of a SIP in federal district courts.'9 Once approved by
the EPA, a SIP becomes enforceable federal law.2 ° To enforce a SIP, the
EPA can issue a Notice of Violation ("NOV"). 1 If the violation continues 30
days after the issuance of the NOV, and the EPA cannot reach an agreement
with the polluting source through negotiations, the EPA may enforce the SIP
either by issuing an administrative order or by instituting an enforcement
(1) Each State may develop and submit to the Administrator a procedure for
implementing and enforcing standards of performance for new sources located
in such State. If the Administrator finds the State procedure is adequate, he
shall delegate to such State any authority he has under this chapter to imple-
ment and enforce such standards.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Administrator from enforcing
any applicable standard of performance under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 7411 (c) (1988).
19. Section 7413(a) & (b) provides:
(a) In general
(1) Order to comply with SIP
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to the Administrator, the
Administrator finds that any person has violated or is in violation of any re-
quirement or prohibition of an applicable implementation plan or permit, the
Administrator shall notify the person and the State in which the plan applies of
such finding. At any time after the expiration of 30 days following the date on
which such notice of a violation is issued, the Administrator may, without re-
gard to the period of violation (subject to section 2462 of Title 28)--
(A) issue an order requiring such person to comply with the requirements or
prohibitions of such plan or permit,
(B) issue an administrative penalty order in accordance with subsection (d) of
this section, or
(C) bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) State failure to enforce SIP or permit program
Whenever, on the basis of information available to the Administrator, the
Administrator finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan or an
approved permit program under subchapter V of this chapter are so widespread
that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the
plan or permit program applies to enforce the plan or permit program effec-
tively, the Administrator shall so notify the State. In the case of a permit pro-
gram, the notice shall be made in accordance with subchapter V of this chap-
ter. If the Administrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after
such notice (90 days in the case of such permit program), the Administrator
shall give public notice of such finding. During the period beginning with such
public notice and ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it
will enforce such plan or permit program (hereafter referred to in this section
as "period of federally assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce
any requirement or prohibition of such plan or permit program with respect to
any person by-
(C) bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Civil judicial enforcement
The Administrator shall, as appropriate, in the case of any person that is the
owner or operator of an affected source, a major emitting facility, or a major
stationary source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence a civil
action for a permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil
penalty of not more than $25,000 per day for each violation, or both, in any of
the following instances:
42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(b) (Supp. V 1993).
20. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1546 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
21. Id.
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action under section 113 of 42 U.S.C. § 7413.22 Section 113 provides for in-
junctive relief, civil penalties,23 and criminal penalties.24
The statute authorizes the Administrator "to enforce a SIP in federal court,
acting as a supervisor to insure [sic] that the federal [air quality] standards are
met. '25 Temporal restrictions limit the supervisory role to the "period of fed-
erally assumed enforcement. '26 This period of federally assumed enforcement
begins when the Administrator notifies a state that violations of the applicable
enforcement plan are so widespread that they appear to have resulted from a
state's failure to effectively enforce the plan. Federally assumed enforcement
ends when the state demonstrates to the Administrator that it will enforce the
SIP.
27
Section 7411(c)(1) delegates the authority to states to implement and
enforce the SIP. The New Mexico Environmental Department ("NMED") in
Espinosa claimed that this delegation of authority was broad enough to allow
NMED to file an additional action in federal court against the defendants
following a successful state action.28
Any effort to bring a second, separate action that "arises out of the same
nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim" potentially implicates the claim
preclusion doctrine.29 Under that doctrine, "a final judgment on the merits
bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of
action."3 The doctrine precludes relitigation of a claim on grounds that were
raised or could have been raised in the prior action.3' The binding status of
the prior action bars subsequent admission of a matter that could have been
raised in the prior action.3"
In Espinosa, neither party contended that the issue in the federal action
did not arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as the state action. Also,
neither party claimed that the state action was not decided on the merits.33
Whether claim preclusion barred the issue in the federal action, therefore,
turned on whether the state could have initially brought a federal enforcement
action.
B. Facts
Roswell Tower, Inc.,34 Ray Bell, and Leonard Talbert (collectively
22. Id.
23. Violators may be assessed up to $25,000 per day. Id.
24. Polluters who knowingly violate an SIP may face criminal penalties. Id.
25. Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491, 492 (10th Cir. 1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2).
27. Id.
28. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492.
29. Lane v. Peterson, 889 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990).
30. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
31. Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993).
32. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974).
33. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492 (seeking damages for the same conduct under the Clean Air
Act and requesting that the district court recognize the state court judgment).
34. Roswell Tower, Inc. is a property management corporation. See Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., (No. CV-91-268)
[Vol. 72:3
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"RTI") owned and operated a commercial office building in New Mexico.3"
During an eight year period (1982-1990), RTI conducted numerous abatement
jobs to'remove and dispose friable asbestos from the ceilings of the occupied
office building.36 The New Mexico Environmental Department and its secre-
tary, Judith M. Espinosa (collectively "NMED"), brought suit in state court
against RTI for alleged violations of environmental regulations and nuisance
laws. 37 The state court awarded the plaintiff penalties of $76,837.3 RTI's
appeal is pending in state court. Subsequent to the state action, NMED initiat-
ed suit in the New Mexico federal district court on the same facts, requesting
that the district court recognize the state court judgment.39 The federal suit
sought to recover money damages of $25,000 per day as available under fed-
eral law,' instead of the maximum $1,000 per day per violation available
under New Mexico state law." The district court granted summary judgment
for RTI holding that: 1) even though NMED could file a federal action under
42 U.S.C. § 7412 to enforce the state emission standards, it could not seek the
federal penalties provided by § 7413; and 2) claim preclusion prevented
NMED from bringing suit in federal court.42 In Espinosa, NMED appealed
the lower court's decision that prevented NMED from invoking federal juris-
diction to seek federal penalties pursuant to the Clean Air Act after having
prevailed on the same issue in the state enforcement action.43
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding
that NMED, having prevailed in a state enforcement action, could not invoke
federal jurisdiction to seek federal penalties under the Clean Air Act.' The
Tenth Circuit found that states' authority, as delegated to the states by the
Clean Air Act, is limited to enforcement of the federally approved SIP through
the state administrative and judicial process. 5 The Tenth Circuit interpreted
the language in § 7413' as the procedural prerequisite to the federal enforce-
(N.M. Complaint filed July 29, 1991).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 2-4.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Appellee's Answer Brief at 2, Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491 (10th Cir.
1994) (No. 93-2238).
39. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
41. Appellee's Answer Brief at 3, Espinosa (No. 93-2238) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-
12(E) (Michie 1978)).
42. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 492.
43. Id. Neither party contended that a successful state action enforcing the $1,000 per day
state penalty precluded the EPA from bringing a federal action in federal court to enforce the
$25,000 per day penalty. The Tenth Circuit declined to address the issue of whether "a state ac-
tion, regardless of the outcome, could be followed by a federal action for the same violation." Id.
at 493 n.2.
44. Id. at 494.
45. Id. at 492. The Court of Appeals included in the states' authority the possibility to en-
force citizens' suits pursuant to § 7604. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
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ment of the states implementation plan. 47 The court found no language in the
Clean Air Act to allow states to pursue federal enforcement actions.' The
provisions authorizing the Administrator to enforce the SIP when the state
fails to do so "underscore the dual enforcement approach with the state gov-
ernment having primary control and federal action serving as an enforcement
safety net."
In concluding its opinion, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that its interpreta-
tion of §§ 7412 & 7413 was consistent with § 7416.0 Section 7416 states
that federal authority preempts state enforcement only when the state regula-
tion is less stringent than the SIP." Although the Tenth Circuit noted that
some cases have acknowledged the availability of jurisdictionally independent
enforcement actions," it rejected the line of reasoning that concludes that the
Clean Air Act allows states to bring federal enforcement actions under §
7412.13 The court rejected Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Administra-
tion5 4 on the grounds that, under claim preclusion, an unsuccessful federal
action brought by a state would result in foreclosing the EPA from filing suit




This case illustrates the respective federal and state roles under the doc-
trine of cooperative federalism. While the limitations of the federal govern-
ment over the states trace back to the framing of the Constitution,56 the limi-
tations on the state role under the doctrine of cooperative federalism are a
relatively recent articulation of the law.
One reason for the resurgence in the doctrine of cooperative federalism
since the 1970s is the proliferation of environmental laws that require the state
and local implementation of federally imposed standards. The Constitution,
however, provides federal legislative authority over individuals as opposed to
states.57 Consequently, the federal authority over states to enforce the federal
mandates imposed by modem environmental law, is restricted to economic
reward or punishment, depending on the state's behavior.58 If a state behaves
as the federal government desires, economic reward in the form of continued
47. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 493.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
51. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494.
52. Id.; see supra note 1.
53. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494 (rejecting the reasoning of Alabama ex rel Graddick v. Vet-
erans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986)).
54. 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
55. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494.
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1966)
("[Wle must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,-the only proper ob-
jects of government.").




federal funding of projects, such as federal highway programs, continues.5 9
When a state "misbehaves," and does not comply with the federal mandate,
the withdrawal of federal funding for such projects constitutes the
punishment.' As long as states have the real choice to deny the federal man-
date and accept the consequence, the cooperative federalism approach is not in
danger of constitutional challenge." The Supreme Court explicitly supported
Congress's ability to "hold out incentives" provided they fall "short of outright
coercion. ' 2
The political ramifications of this type of system allow for the account-
ability of local interests to vest in the local electorate.63 For example, in a
state faced with a choice of implementing an unpopular federal mandate, the
political system is empowered to elect representation reflecting the local pref-
erence to suffer the economic consequences rather than comply with the feder-
al mandate. If the will of the people changes, the political system will reflect
that change and elect new representation consistent with the local goals.
The divided responsibilities of state and federal agencies in promulgating
and enforcing environmental laws create other advantages and disadvantages.
Participation at the federal level provides for the establishment of a consistent
set of national standards creating a minimum, or "floor," level of values that
serve as an environmental safety net.64 Federal involvement helps reduce the
temptation at the local level to attract new business to the area at the expense
of the environment by imposing a relaxed set of standards.65 Federal involve-
ment also helps prevent control of the state or local agency by the industries
supplying jobs and economic health to a region when these industries are not
in compliance with the law.
On the other hand, state involvement allows states to respond to state and
local goals and set standards that are more restrictive than those established by
the federal government. State action is not without cost however. Unfunded
federal mandates placed on the states can be a significant financial burden and
a source of political friction.' Also, a divided responsibility system creates
problems relating to the division of responsibility, and the resolution of incon-
sistencies in the system. The ruling in Roswell Tower, Inc. indicates that the
Tenth Circuit values the safety net provided by a consistent set of national
environmental standards over the burdens resulting from the unfunded federal






64. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 98 (1975); see also United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that states have rights to
impose limitations and standards more stringent than federal regulations promulgated under the
Clean Water Act).
65. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539, 1550 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
66. See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1507, 1518 (D. Mont. 1994) (questioning
the proper relationship between the federal government and the several states, and in particular,
the constitutionality of federally imposed unfunded mandates to the states).
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bility system.
2. State Enforcement in Federal Court
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Alabama ex rel.
Graddick, the federal district court in that case did not condone state enforce-
ment of federal law in federal court.6 7 In Graddick, the Alabama federal dis-
trict held that a state can enforce state law in either state or federal court.'
The federal court exercised pendent jurisdiction because, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(d)(1), the EPA adopted the state air pollution law.69
Standing alone, the language used by the Graddick court, stating that the
"[state agency] cannot be said to be attempting to enforce state regulations
without also being found to be enforcing federal regulations,"7 ° appears am-
biguous. In context, however, this statement becomes clear. The federal district
court made this statement in response to the defendant's contention that the
State of Alabama could not enforce state regulations for civil penalties in
federal court.7 ' The issue of whether a state could enforce federal law in fed-
eral court did not arise in Graddick.2
This contextual interpretation, (determining where state law may be en-
forced) is further supported in the federal district court's subsequent discussion
of the House of Representatives Report No. 294, which addressed the state's
"power to enforce state sanctions against federal facilities. ' 73 This discussion
centered on whether federal parties may be defendants, not on whether the
state may enforce federal law in federal court.
The real issue in Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., therefore, was not
whether a state could bring a state enforcement action in federal court after
having brought the same action in state court, but rather, could a state enforce
a federal law (the $25,000 per day civil penalty) in federal court after success-
fully bringing a state enforcement action ($1000 per day civil penalty) in state
court? In this case, the Tenth Circuit held that the state has no authority to en-
force the federal civil penalty.74 Left unanswered, however, is why the state
has no such authority. Two possibilities exist. First, the Tenth Circuit may be
judicially limiting the "full authority to ... implement and enforce ... Na-
tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)" that the
EPA granted to New Mexico.7" The second possibility is that NMED's first
action to enforce the $1000 per day state penalty precluded them from en-
forcing the $25,000 per day federal penalty under the doctrine of claim preclu-
sion. This second possibility leaves unanswered the question of whether
67. See Graddick, 648 F. Supp. at 1211.
68. Id.
69. The state law adopted was Chapter 13 of the Alabama Department of Environmental




73. Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
74. See supra text accompanying note 48.
75. 55 Fed. Reg. 5990 (1990).
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NMED could have enforced the $25,000 per day federal penalty if they had
not previously enforced the $1000 per day state penalty.
In rejecting the Graddick analysis because "it would... permit an unsuc-
cessful federal action brought by a state to foreclose the Administrator from
filing suit under the [federal] Clean Air Act," the Tenth Circuit made an un-
necessary statement.76 It is unnecessary because it addressed a moot point.
Graddick neither supported nor refuted the central issue in Espinosa77 of
whether a state agency may enforce a federal penalty in federal court. Reject-
ing the Graddick analysis, therefore, was unnecessary to the Espinosa deci-
sion.
3. Claim Preclusion
The lower court's ruling, affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, also held that
claim preclusion prevents NMED from bringing a federal action. 78 Most of
the Tenth Circuit's opinion addressed the state's authority to bring an enforce-
ment action in federal court; the claim preclusion issue elicited no direct re-
sponse. Since the court unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision, with
no reversal in part concerning the claim preclusion holding, it appears that the
Tenth Circuit concurred in toto with the decision below. In rejecting the rea-
soning in Graddick,79 however, the Tenth Circuit concluded the opinion with
dicta that seems to leave the door open for a federal suit brought by the EPA
on the same claim unsuccessfully brought by a state in federal court.8 0 Such a
suggestion implies that if the state had the authority to, and did bring the
action in federal court, the EPA could still bring a separate action despite its
failure to join the state's federal enforcement proceedings. This contradicts the
court's apparent affirmation that claim preclusion barred the present action.
Throughout its opinion, the court referred to the dual enforcement ap-
proach in a context of either state or federal action, rather than one of both
state and federal action. For example, the court stated that the Administrator
may assess the penalty if a state fails to do so; 8" and referred to "federal ac-
tion serving as a federal safety net."82 To allow federal action following un-
successful state action in federal court goes beyond the intended purpose of
providing a federal safety net.83
76. Espinosa, 32 F.3d at 494.
77. Id. at 492.
78. Id.
79. 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
80. See Espinosa 32 F.3d at 494 (rejecting the analysis because "it would seem to permit an
unsuccessful federal action brought by a state to foreclose the Administrator from filing suit under
the Clean Air Act").
81. Id. at 493.
82. Id.
83. See supra text accompanying note 64.
1995]
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II. STATE AND LOCAL PREEMPTION OF RCRA: BLUE CIRCLE CEMENT, INC. V.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
4
A. Background
Unlike the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"),85 which addresses the cleanup of existing pollu-
tion, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") s6 regulates new
and active contamination sources. RCRA's goal is to minimize pollution by
tracing wastes8 7 and by conserving resources.8 To achieve at least a mini-
84. 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
87. RCRA established a "cradle to grave" tracking system for both solid and hazardous
wastes to prevent the unauthorized storage, treatment and disposal of wastes that are harmful to
health and the environment. This system requires that a manifest accompany all solid or hazardous
wastes from the time of their "generation" to their ultimate disposal. One of the keys to under-
standing RCRA is the complex relationship between "solid waste" and "hazardous waste" and the
differing statutory and regulatory definitions of each. Section 6903(27) of the statute defines solid
waste as any "garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant,
or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural opera-
tions, and from community activities." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988). The same section exempts
from the definition of solid waste all solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or
dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges that are point sources subject
to permits under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 7342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), or
special nuclear, or byproduct materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA"), 42 U.S.C.
2011 (1988). Id. In other words, just about everything that is discarded constitutes a solid waste
unless it is already regulated by the CWA or AEA or constitutes domestic sewage or irrigation
runoff. Although the statute does not define the term discarded, the regulatory definition is any
material which is abandoned [in certain ways], or recycled [in certain ways], or considered inher-
ently waste-like. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2. (1994). Both the statute and the regulations contain definitions
of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5); 40 C.F.R. § 261.3. (1994). Common to both the statuto-
ry and regulatory definition is the requirement that a hazardous waste must also be a solid waste.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). A substance, therefore, that meets the statutory definition of being a "sub-
stantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of" is not subject to RCRA unless it is also a solid waste. Id.
Practically, this means that even very dangerous substances are not regulated by RCRA until they
are disposed. Thus, the regulatory definition determining when a substance is disposed of becomes
a critical element in any RCRA action.
88. Section 6902 of RCRA states:
(a) Objectives
The objectives of this chapter are to promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources by-
(6) minimizing the generation of hazardous waste and the land disposal of
hazardous waste by encouraging process substitution, materials recovery, prop-
erly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment;
(7) establishing a viable Federal-State partnership to carry out the purposes of
this chapter and insuring that the Administrator will, in carrying out the provi-
sions of subchapter III of this chapter give a high priority to assisting and co-
operating with States in obtaining full authorization of State programs under
subchapter III of this chapter,
(11) establishing a cooperative effort among the Federal, State, and local gov-
ernments and private enterprise in order to recover valuable materials and
energy from solid waste.
[Vol. 72:3
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mum national environmental standard, Congress bars states and municipalities
from imposing less stringent requirements than the federal RCRA provi-
sions.8 9 In keeping with the theme of a state/federal cooperative effort, states
have the authority to adopt more stringent provisions than those set forth by
the federal EPA." The federal RCRA provisions, therefore, establish a
"floor," as opposed to a "ceiling," limit on pollution standards.9
The policy objectives behind RCRA's promotion of recovering materials
and properly conducting recycling and reuse92 include: 1) recovering energy
and other valuable items from discarded materials; 2) avoiding environmental
dangers; 3) protecting a scarce land supply; 4) reducing the trade balance; and
5) reducing the nation's reliance on foreign energy and materials.93 A state's
ability to impose additional restrictions to address their local preferences re-
garding these goals, however, creates a potential for conflict between state and
federal law. When, as in Blue Circle Cement, the state's RCRA provisions
conflict with the federal provisions, preemption becomes an issue.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states that "the
laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 9 4 In the absence of explicit
preemptive language in a federal statute, the United States Supreme Court
recognizes two types of implied preemption.95 First, "field preemption" refers
to situations where the scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for States to supple-
ment it." The second type of implied preemption is "conflict preemp-
(b) National policy
The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States
that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or
eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated
should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and
future threat to human health and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988).
89. Section 6929 states:
Upon the effective date of regulations under this subchapter no State or political subdi-
vision may impose any requirements less stringent than those authorized under this
subchapter respecting the same matter as governed by such regulations, except that if
application of a regulation with respect to any matter under this subchapter is postponed
or enjoined by the action of any court, no State or political subdivision shall be prohib-
ited from acting with respect to the same aspect of such matter until such time as such
regulation takes effect. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State or
political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements, including those for site
selection, which are more stringent than those imposed by such regulations.
42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
90. Id.
91. See Old Bridge Chemicals, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287,
1292 (3d Cir. 1992).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(6).
93. Blue Circle Cement, Inc., v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir.
1994).
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
95. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1504.
96. Id. (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion. ' Conflict preemption occurs where "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility" or where state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.""
Because Congress set only a floor and not a ceiling in RCRA,"u express
or implied preemption does not exist where the state or local regulations are
more restrictive than RCRA."'0 Congress explicitly provides in § 6929 that
state and local governments may adopt solid and hazardous waste regulations
more stringent than those imposed by federal EPA. 2 This explicit provision
precludes an implication of federal supremacy via field preemption. Therefore,
only if state or local ordinances regulating the treatment, storage, and disposal
of hazardous waste frustrate the "full accomplishment of congressional purpos-
es embodied in [RCRA]" (an example of conflict preemption), would the
federal provisions preempt state or local provisions. 3
B. Facts
In the early 1980s, Blue Circle Cement, Inc. ("Blue Circle") planned to
convert its coal and natural gas fired cement kilns to use Hazardous Waste
Fuels ("HWFs").' ° The zoning ordinance in effect at the time made no ref-
erence to recycling operations but required industrial operators to obtain a
conditional use permit to establish an "industrial waste disposal site."'05 Blue
Circle considered burning HWFs to constitute "recycling" or "burning for
energy recovery""'° rather than disposal.'0" Consequently, Blue Circle did
not believe that the ordinance required a conditional use permit for their pro-
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
99. Id. (quoting Hines V. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
100. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
101. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1504.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6929.
103. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1505.
104. HWFs are a less expensive type of fuel that contain industrial wastes with a high British
Thermal Unit ("BTU") value. Id. at 1501-02.
105. Id. at 1502; see CLAREMORE-ROGERS COUNTY, OKLA., METROPOLITAN PLANNING
COMM'N ZONING ORDINANCE § 3.13.2.
106. The EPA recognized that "burning of hazardous wastes as fuels can be a type of recy-
cling activity exempted from regulation." 48 Fed. Reg. 11,157-58 (1983). The burning must con-
stitute legitimate, as opposed to sham, recycling to fall within the exemption. 48 Fed. Reg. 11,158
(1983). The "energy value of the hazardous waste being ... burned "is the primary factor in dis-
tinguishing sham from legitimate burning for energy recovery. A limit of 5000 BTU/lb. is general-
ly considered the minimum for a legitimate hazardous waste fuel. 56 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1991). "If
the wastes being burned have only de minimis energy value, the burning cannot recover sufficient
energy to characterize the practice as legitimate recycling .... [Tihe wastes, for practical purposes
are being burned to be destroyed." 48 Fed. Reg. 11,158 (1983). The nature of the device used to
burn the hazardous waste can be relevant to whether the material is being recycled by being
burned for energy recovery or abandoned by being burned or incinerated. United States v. Self, 2
F.3d 1071, 1080 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993). High BTU materials burned in an incinerator that is unable
to retrieve the energy from the material is considered to be burned for destruction. Id. Likewise,
low BTU materials burned in a boiler or industrial furnace are also considered to be burned for
the purpose of destruction because of their limited energy value. Id.
107. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1502.
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posed conversion."a The board of County Commissioners of Rogers County,
Oklahoma ("Board") disagreed and informed Blue Circle that the ordinance re-
quired the permit." Rather than apply for the permit, Blue Circle filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma,
seeking a declaratory judgment that burning HWFs did not constitute industrial
disposal."' While Blue Circle's suit was pending, the Board amended the
ordinance to require a conditional use permit for "recycling" and "treatment"
of HWFs. " Blue Circle amended its complaint to allege that the amended
ordinance: 1) was preempted by RCRA; 2) constituted a violation of the Com-
merce Clause; and 3) could not equitably be enforced retroactively."' 2 The
District Court denied both Blue Circle's summary judgment motion and the
Board's motion to dismiss.' Immediately before trial, however, the district
court sua sponte issued a summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court
held that: 1) RCRA did not preempt the Ordinance; 2) the Ordinance did not
violate the Commerce Clause; and 3) Blue Circle had not acquired a vested
right to use HWFs and, therefore, the amended Ordinance was constitutional
as applied." 4 Blue Circle appealed the summary judgment.
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit swiftly reversed the district court's sua sponte grant of
summary judgment, citing procedural grounds and prejudice to the non-moving
party.' Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) authorizes courts to
treat motions to dismiss as requests for summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit
found that Blue Circle had not received the requisite "reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."' 16 The
court reasoned that because Blue Circle had been denied the opportunity to
present its own factual materials in defense of the summary judgment motion,
the district court's actions were prejudicial. The finding of prejudice prevented
the Tenth Circuit from holding that the lower court's ruling constituted harm-
less error." 7 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceed-
108. See id. at 1502.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The Rogers County Ordinance, § 3.13.2, "Industrial Waste
Disposal/Recycling/Treatment" as amended states:
An Industrial Waste Disposal/Recycling/Treatment Site shall not be less than one
hundred sixty (160) acres in size and no other industrial waste dispos-
al/recycling/treatment site shall be nearer than one (1) mile (5,280 feet) in any direction
from the proposed industrial waste/recycling/treatment site. The site will be as nearly
square as possible.
All industrial waste disposal/recycling/treatment sites shall be located at least one
(1) mile from any platted residential subdivision.
Id. at 1509.
112. Id. at 1502.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1502-03.
115. Id. at 1503-04.
116. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
117. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1503-04.
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ings on the summary judgment issue." '
The Tenth Circuit also reversed and remanded on the dormant Commerce
Clause issue."9 The court stated that because the ordinance operates
evenhandedly, in that it does not distinguish between hazardous waste generat-
ed within and outside Rogers County, the less stringent Pike test applied rather
than the stricter test reserved for statutes that explicitly discriminate based on
the origin of the article of commerce. 20 Because the district court failed to
apply the Pike test, the court of appeals held that the record was inadequate to
support a summary judgment for the Board on the commerce clause chal-
lenge. 2 '
On the retroactivity issue, the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Board. 2 In the district court proceeding,
Blue Circle contended that it would be inequitable to apply the amended ordi-
nance after they had incurred engineering and planning costs in reliance on the
conditions imposed by the original ordinance.'23 The district court ruled that
Blue Circle had no vested rights in burning HWFs at its cement plant prior to
the Board's amendment to section 3.13.2. '12 Blue Circle reformulated its ar-
gument on appeal.'" Blue Circle alleged that the Board acted inequitably by
amending the ordinance to specifically thwart their HWF project.'26 The
Court of Appeals refused to follow In re Julius Bankoff,'21 the only authority
supporting Blue Circle's claim, because the original opinion, "Bankoff I," had
been withdrawn and superseded. Its successor, "Bankoff II,'"' had not yet
been released for publication and, therefore, the opinion lacked precedential
value. 29
On the issue of whether RCRA preempted the Board's ordinance, the
Tenth Circuit held that a genuine issue of material fact existed and remanded
for a factual determination.10 The court's holding focused on the inappropri-
ateness of the summary judgment.13' The record reflected Blue Circle's con-
tention that no 160-acre plot existed in the county meeting that could meet the
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1512.
120. Id. at 1511-12. The Pike test requires the court to scrutinize: 1) the nature of the local
putative benefits advanced by the ordinance; 2) the burden the Ordinance imposes on interstate
commerce; 3) whether the burden is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits; and 4)
whether the local interests can be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.
Id. at 1512; see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
121. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1512.
122. Id. at 1514.
123. See id. at 1502.
124. Id. at 1503.
125. Id. at 1513.
126. Id.
127. No. 69586 & No. 78146, 1992 WL 131940 (Okla. June 16, 1992) ("Bankoff I").
128. In re Julius Bankoff, 875 P.2d 1138 (Okla. 1994) ("Bankoff II").
129. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1513. Under Rule 1.200(B)(E) of the Oklahoma Rules of
Appellate Procedure an unpublished opinion "shall not be considered as precedent by any court or
in any brief or other material presented to any court, except to support a claim of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case." Id.




criteria listed in Rogers County Ordinance § 3.13.2.32 The record also re-
flected, however, that the Board had identified three sites that, if rezoned from
floodplain to industrial, would qualify under the ordinance.' 33 Because Blue
Circle could apply for a variance from the zoning requirements, the Board
argued that the ordinance did not constitute an absolute ban on hazardous
waste.' 34 Blue Circle, in turn, argued that the alternative sites did not meet
requirements for storing and burning hazardous wastes because of their flood-
plain status and, therefore, it was inconceivable the sites would be rezoned to
permit such activity.' 5 The court considered this exchange on the record to
constitute "a serious [factual] dispute over whether this ordinance imposes a
de facto ban on the burning of HWFs in Rogers County."'
' 36
In addition to reversing and remanding the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the Board on the preemption issue, the Tenth Circuit pro-
vided explicit guidance to the lower court on remand. In so doing, the Tenth
Circuit drew upon a somewhat limited, albeit consistent, body of case law to
direct the preemption analysis. 37 Where state or local ordinances constitute
an explicit or de facto total ban of an activity otherwise encouraged by RCRA,
the federal RCRA provisions preempt those state or local provisions.
38
When the ordinance does not operate as a complete ban on the encouraged
activity, no preemption results, provided that the ordinance is supported by a
record establishing it as a reasonable response to a legitimate local concern for
safety or welfare.139 If the state or local ordinance does not address, or is not
reasonably related to, a legitimate concern, then it "may be regarded as a sham
and nothing more than a naked attempt to sabotage federal RCRA policy of
encouraging the safe and efficient disposition of hazardous waste materi-
als."'1
40
The Tenth Circuit instructed the lower court on remand to follow the lead
of the Eighth Circuit 4 ' and the Supreme Courts of Louisiana,42
Arkansas,4 3 and Wyoming'" in concluding that a total ban on encouraged
132. See supra note 116.




137. Id. at 1508.
138. Id.; ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v.
City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1446-47 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Jacksonville v. Arkansas Dep't
of Pollution Control and Ecology, 824 S.W.2d. 840, 842 (Ark. 1992); Rollins Envtl. Servs. v.
Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So.2d 1127, 1132 (La. 1979).
139. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508; Lafarge Corp. v. Campbell, 813 F. Supp. 501,
508-12 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Old Bridge Chemicals, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
965 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (3d Cir. 1992); North Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Upjohn Co.,
753 F. Supp. 423, 431 (D. Conn.), aff d, 921 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508.
141. See ENSCO, 807 F.2d at 745 (finding that RCRA preempted county ordinance that im-
posed an outright ban on storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste).
142. Rollins, 371 So.2d at 1132 (holding that RCRA preempted a parish ordinance's flat ban
on hazardous waste disposal).
143. City of Jacksonville, 824 S.W.2d at 842 (holding that RCRA preempted a city ordinance
that barred the incineration of hazardous waste because the local measure frustrated RCRA's
"preference for treatment rather than land disposal of hazardous waste").
144. Hermes Consol., Inc. v. People, 849 P.2d 1302, 1311 (Wyo. 1993) ("[Allthough [§ 6929]
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activity will result in preemption by RCRA 45 If, on the other hand, the low-
er court should find that the ordinance falls short of a total ban, a finding of
preemption is only compelled if the record fails to support a legitimate con-
cern. " Such a finding is likely since the Board conceded that no documents
exist to support the Board's concern for the amendment to section 3.133.2.' 4
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Blue Circle Cement makes a significant
contribution to the analysis of RCRA issues regarding implied preemption.
The two part test articulated by the court," however, falls short of providing
a clear guide to the present state of the law. For example, the first part of the
test states: "ordinances that amount to an explicit or de facto ban on an activi-
ty that is otherwise encouraged by RCRA will ordinarily be preempted by
RCRA."' 49 Two problems arise in applying this part of the test to a given set
of facts. First, the opinion provides no definition of the term "ordinarily." By
including this term, the court correctly suggested that circumstances can exist
that allow an ordinance with a total ban effect to avoid RCRA preemption.
The court, however, did not address what constitutes such circumstances.
The second problem arises when the effect of an ordinance constitutes a
total ban, yet the elusive circumstances allowing such a total ban to survive
RCRA preemption are not satisfied. Theoretically, the district court could rule
on remand that the effect of the Board's ordinance constituted a permissible de
facto ban on HWF burning, an activity encouraged by RCRA. Without an
articulated standard, Blue Circle is unable to overcome such a determination.
This effectively removes the state from the purported cooperative federal/state
process.
The Tenth Circuit recognized the possibility that a total ban on hazardous
waste activity in a densely populated residential area, thereby constituting a
significant threat to health or safety, could be upheld as a reasonable exercise
of state and local authority over that of RCRA. 50 Such an example, with a
clearly articulated factual determination of risk in a densely populated area,
does little to guide the analysis of the next case in which the determination of
risk and density of population may fall more in the "gray zone" of legal and
factual certainty.
Perhaps a heightened degree of scrutiny should be built into part one of
the implied preemption test. With this heightened scrutiny, courts could re-
allows states to adopt more stringent regulations, it does not authorize them to defeat safe federal
solutions ... [or] to directly subvert RCRA and [EPA] decisions by outright bans on activities
federal authorities considered safe.").
145. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1505. Implied preemption prevents the frustration of the
full accomplishment of congressional purposes. Id.
146. Id. at 1510 n.10. Blue Circle had asked the Board to identify any documents that address
the "scope, necessity, or basis" for the amendment. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 1508.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1508 n.7.
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quire more than just a reasonable state or local interest for an ordinance that
results in an explicit or de facto ban: a state or local ordinance could only
survive preemption by RCRA if it constituted a means substantially related to
a compelling state interest.
Part two of the Tenth Circuit's implied preemption rule states: "an ordi-
nance that falls short of imposing a total ban on encourage activity will ordi-
narily be upheld so long as it is supported by a record establishing that it is a
reasonable response to a legitimate local concern for safety or welfare.''
Language such as "reasonable response" and "legitimate local concern" sug-
gests that the court is applying a rational basis standard of review. The fact
that the Tenth Circuit established a two part test, with the rational basis stan-
dard of review applied only to the second part, arguably suggests that the
court envisioned a heightened level of scrutiny for part one, even if it did not
explicitly articulate it as such.
The analysis of part two of the Tenth Circuit's implied preemption test
reveals that it actually consists of four sub-parts. The first sub-part focuses on
the effect of the ordinance. In essence, the effect of the ordinance determines
whether part one or two of the test is controlling. Anything short of an explicit
or de facto ban on the RCRA encouraged activity falls under part two of the
test. Sub-part two requires that a record support both sub-parts three and four.
Sub-parts three and four constitute the traditional elements of the rational basis
standard of review. For example, sub-part three requires the ordinance to be a
reasonable response to sub-part four, which requires a legitimate concern for
safety or welfare.
In summary, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Blue Circle Cement consoli-
dated a consistent body of law within the circuits regarding implied preemp-
tion in RCRA cases. It failed, however, to capitalize on an opportunity to set
forth a clear rule articulating the consistent body of law within the circuits.
CONCLUSION
In Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., the Tenth Circuit limited a state's
enforcement authority of federally approved SIPs. The court held that a state
may not pursue enforcement of federal sanctions when it has previously en-
forced state sanctions for the same violation. Under these facts, the Tenth
Circuit limits states' authority to state administrative and judicial review.
Whether this decision reserves all enforcement through the federal judicial
process to the federal agencies, however, remains unanswered. This decision
conforms to the congressional delegation of primary responsibility for the
prevention and control of air pollution to states and the supervision and en-
forcement authority delegated to federal authorities. 52 The decision departs
from accepted notions of claim preclusion, however, in that it implies that a
federal agency may relitigate the same issue against the same party that suc-
cessfully defended itself on that issue against a state agency.
151. Id. at 1508.
152. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
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In Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, the Tenth
Circuit described its approach to the issue of federal preemption of state ordi-
nances under RCRA. The court missed an opportunity to articulate a clear rule
regarding the respective standard of review applicable to ordinances that con-
stitute a total ban, or a partial ban of a RCRA encouraged activity. The deci-
sion, however, is consistent in structure with that of the Eighth Circuit and
various state Supreme Courts. It implied that Blue Circle Cement is an exam-
ple of federal RCRA preemption of a local ordinance due to the failure to
show, on the record, that the ordinance reasonably relates to a legitimate state
concern. The Tenth Circuit, in both Blue Circle Cement and Espinosa, af-
firmed the dominant role it ascribes to federal authority in the cooperative
federal/state approach to environmental enforcement.
John M. Stafford
